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Abstract
This paper analyzes the different compositions of the catalan gov-
erning coalitions during the current democratic period, and offers some
predictions about the coalitions that can be expected in the future.
During this period, in catalan politics, there have been two main polit-
ical issues over which the different parties have taken positions: right-
ist versus leftist with respect to economic policy, and sovereign versus
centralist with respect to the power distribution within the state. I
find that for any allocation of parliament seats there is a key party: a
party that has a clear advantage in terms of being able to decide the
composition of the governing coalition. I show the features that allow
a party to become the key party and those that affect the size of the
advantage of the key party.
1 Introduction
During the current spanish democratic period, in catalan politics, there have
been two main political issues over which the different parties have taken
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positions: rightist versus leftist with respect to economic policy, and sovereign
versus centralist with respect to the power distribution within the state. For
a description of the catalan nationalist movements see Guibernau (1997) and
Weiss (2002).
Given the relevance of these two issues, catalan parties have defined their
ideologies taking positions over them. Even though at the first elections
of the period (1980) there were six parties competing, over the years the
parliament seats have been allocated to mainly four parties, with different
ideal positions in the two dimensional policy space: CIU nationalist and
rightist, ERC nationalist and leftist, PPC centralist and rightist, and PSC
centralist and leftist. Table 1 contains the results of all elections for the
catalan parliament held between 1980 and 2006.
In order to analyze formally the formation of a governing coalition in
this environment I will use the model described in Aragones (2007) specially
suited for four parties competing in a two dimensional policy space. Through-
out this paper it should be understood that a governing coalition refers to
the coalition of parties that offers support to the government, and it does not
refer necessarily to the allocation of cabinet ministers. Laver and Schofield
(1990) offer a detailed description of the roles of executive and legislative
coalitions in european democracies.
After almost forty years of dictatorship in 1977 the first democratic elec-
tions were held in Spain. In 1978 took place a referendum on the current
spanish Constitution. It allowed for a new regime that included a system of
Autonomous Communities. In 1979 took place a referendum on the Catalan
Statute and in 1980 the first Catalan parliament was elected. Guibernau
(1997) offers a detailed description of the spanish transition to the ’state of
autonomies’. Colomer (1998) describes the decentralization process of Spain
and compares it to different federal and regional organizations.
With respect to the catalan governing coalitions formed during the demo-
cratic period we have that in 1980 the governing coalition that formed in-
cluded CIU, ERC, and UCD. This election can also be thought of as a tran-
sition election, since political parties were being formed and legalized after
forty years of dictatorship.
In the first three elections after 1980, CIU obtained an absolute majority
of seats in the parliament. Obviously in those cases (the legislatures starting
at 1984, 1988, and 1992) the government was formed by party CIU alone;
there was no need to bargain over policy, and the policy implemented was
determined by CIU alone. In the next two elections, corresponding to the
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legislatures starting at 1995 and 1999, the governing coalition that formed
was CIU with PPC. Finally, the governing coalitions formed in 2003 and
2006, included PSC, IC and ERC.
Formal Model:
Aragones (2007) describes a model of government formation in a two di-
mensional policy space and shows how a given electoral result leads to a given
government analyzing a model of government formation with a two dimen-
sional policy space. The predictions are described by a coalition of parties
supported by a majority of votes, and a policy supported by the parties in
the coalition. A characterization of all stable government configurations in
terms of coalitions and policies is provided.
The solution concept used is based on stable governing coalitions. The
concept of the core, borrowed from cooperative game theory (see, for in-
stance, Moulin (1988) or Myerson (1990)) is used as a measure of stability.
This assumption is particularly relevant when I consider the formation of the
coalition that sustains an executive in office on the basis of a confidence vote.
The members of this coalition consume all the benefits of office-holding, and
have the control of all policy outputs. There is no binding agreement in this
coalition: a non-confidence motion may be proposed at any time. In the
legislative bargaining model that I present the non-empty core conditions
described by Plott (1967) are satisfied for a large range of parameter values.
These conditions guarantee the formation of a stable governing coalition.
It is assumed that parties care mostly about holding office, and only
instrumentally about policy, that is, they are concerned about their policy
choice because by compromising their ideology today, they might jeopardize
their vote support in future elections and thus their future expected payoff
in terms of their probability of holding office in the future. A party’s current
value of holding office is represented with an exogenous positive constant.
The value of holding office can be also thought of as an individual rationality
constraint for the party: it represents the maximal amount of utility that it
is willing to give up in terms of policy. For example, a party that attaches a
large value to holding office might be willing to commit to policies far away
from its ideal point in order to guarantee becoming a member of the winning
coalition.
I assume complete party discipline, that is, I assume that all members of
a party have the same preferences. Therefore, I define the preferences and
actions of a given party as representing the preferences and actions of all
its members. I assume that different parties have different ideal points in
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a two dimensional policy space. I consider four parties whose ideal points
are represented by the vertices of the unit square. If different parties share
the same ideological position over the two relevant dimensions I assume that
they form a natural coalition that acts as a unique strategic agent when
bargaining to form a government. However, in most cases I find a unique
party for each position. Thus, I can classify the parties into four ideological
groups (see table 2). The groups identified as CIU, ERC and PPC represent
the corresponding party.
The case of PPC needs a justification: I have identified it with UCD,
CDS and AP before 1992, when PPC was created. The reason is that it can
be thought that over time these parties have only changed their name but
not their ideology. I have also included in the ideological group ’rightist and
centralist’ denoted by PPC the seats obtained by the party "Ciutadans" dur-
ing the last election. According to his ideology, this party could be included
in either PSC or PPC, and in either case my results would not be affected.
I have chosen to add this small party to the other smallest party, PPC, in
order to make my results stronger.
Similarly, the creation of IC in 1988 can be thought of as a replacement
of a former leftist party, PSUC. The fourth group identified as PSC+IC
represents two different socialist parties. Since 1988, PSC obtains one of the
largest share of the votes and IC obtains one of the smallest. In addition they
share a leftist ideology and none of them has shown a clear nationalist one.
Thus, it does not seem a strong assumption to consider them as a natural
coalition.
I assume that a governing coalition can only be formed with the support
of a majority of the votes of the parliament, that is, it must be a winning
coalition according to majority rule. And I also assume that only governing
coalitions can decide on the policy to be implemented. In case a single party
has a majority, it can implement its ideal point on both issues. my interest
focuses on those cases in which no party has a majority. In my formal analysis
I will identify a minority government with the coalition that has offered its
support to allow the formation of the government, even in those cases in
which only one party enters the cabinet.
Using this model I find that in the catalan political environment for any
allocation of parliament seats only two scenarios are possible: either there
is a party that is a member of almost all equilibrium coalitions (dominant
party scenario) or there is a party that is never a member of an equilibrium
coalition (dominated party scenario). I find that in each one of these scenarios
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there is a key party: a party that has a clear advantage in terms of being
able to decide the composition of the governing coalition. I characterize the
key party for each possible scenario and I show that it is sufficient that the
key party has intense preferences over one of the issues to guarantee the
formation of a stable government coalition. In addition, I show the features
that allow a party to become the key party and those that affect the size of
the advantage of the key party. Using these results, I analyze the different
governments that have formed in Catalonia between 1980 and 2003, and I
offer some predictions about the different government configurations that can
be expected in the future.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section describes
the formal model. Section 3 characterizes the coalitions that may form in
equilibrium and the policies that can be supported in equilibrium by such
coalitions. Section 4 contains the discussion of the results and some possi-
ble extensions of the formal model. Section 5 describes the implications of
the results over past and future governments of Catalonia. Finally section 6
presents some strategic implications for the catalan parties.
2 The Model
I analyze an application of the model described in Aragones (2007) that
fits the specific features of the catalan political environment. I consider
a two-dimensional policy space represented by <2. I denote a policy by
(e, s) ∈ <2 and I interpret e and s as a pair of policy positions on the
two issues: economic policy and nationalism, denoted respectively by E and
S. Parties are characterized by their ideal points in the policy space. Let
(ei, si) ∈ <2 denote the ideal point of party i. I assume that there are four
parties denoted PSC+IC, ERC, CIU, and PPC. I normalize their ideal points
in such a way that they can be represented by (0, 0) , (0, 1) , (1, 1) , and (1, 0)
respectively. That is, on the economic issue 0 represents a leftist position and
1 represents a rightist position, whereas on the nationalist issue 0 represents
a centralist position and 1 represents a nationalist position. Assuming that
the ideal points of the parties are located at the edges of the unit square
simplifies greatly the analysis. A discussion about how it could be relaxed
without affecting qualitatively the results can be found in Aragones (2007).
I assume that an election has already taken place, and the proportions of
parliament seats that each party has obtained are given by vPSC+IC , vERC , vCIU ,
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and vPPC . Thus, I have that vPSC+IC+vERC+vCIU+vPPC = 1 and 0 ≤ vi ≤ 1
for all i ∈ {PSC + IC, ERC, CIU , PPC} .
I will restrict my analysis to the cases in which vi < 12 for all i. The case in
which there is a party i such that vi > 12 leads to a trivial analysis: this party
alone will form the government and the implemented policy will coincide
with its ideal point. The case in which there is a party i such that vi = 12
is not considered either, because it is not possible in the catalan parliament
since the number of seats is odd (135 seats).
I assume that parties are mainly concerned about holding office, that is,
they derive utility from being members of the governing coalition. I also
assume that the governing coalition has to implement a policy. Even though
this model does not consider any strategic role played by the voter, I assume
that at each election voters decide their vote by evaluating parties according
to the policies chosen while in office. Since voters care about the policy imple-
mented I assume that they consider the members of the governing coalition
responsible of the policy choice made. Therefore, even though I assume that
parties are mainly concerned about holding office, I have that, indirectly,
parties that are members of the governing coalition care about the policy
implemented, since it may affect their vote support in future elections. I
assume that the payoffs of parties that are not members of the governing
coalition are not affected by the policy choice of the government, since voters
do not hold responsible of the policy choice those parties that are not in the
governing coalition. I normalize the utility of a party that is not a member
of the governing coalition to zero, and I represent the utility that party i
obtains if it becomes a member of the governing coalition when the imple-
mented policy is (e, s) ∈ <2 by Ui (e, s) . Therefore, I can write the payoff
function of party i as follows:
Vi (C, (e, s)) =
½
0 if i /∈ C
Ui (e, s) if i ∈ C
where C denotes the governing coalition, (e, s) represents the implemented
policy and Ui (e, s) is given by:
Ui (e, s) = ki − i (e− ei)2 − σi (s− si)2 with i, σi > 0 and i + σi = 1.
where ki ∈ <+ represents the utility that a party derives from being a mem-
ber of the governing coalition. According to this utility function, parties’
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preferences over policies are single peaked and convex but not necessarily
symmetric. The parameters i and σi represent the relative importance of
the two issues in the ideology of party i. If σi = i, both issues, nationalism
and economic policy, have the same weight on the utility that party i derives
from the policy implemented, thus both issues are as important in the ideol-
ogy of the party. If σi > i the position taken on nationalism is regarded as
more valuable than the position taken on economic policy by party i, and if
σi < i the position taken on economic policy is regarded as more important
than the party’s position on nationalism. We have that as the value of σi in-
creases, nationalism becomes more important for party i, and therefore party
i requires a more favorable compromise on nationalism for a given deal on
economic policy. See figure 1. I rule out the possibility that σi = 0 or σi = 1
(thus, i = 1 or i = 0), since these extreme preferences are rarely observed
in the case I analyze: all parties always have cared about both issues.
A necessary condition for a coalition to become a governing coalition is
that it has the support of a majority in the parliament. I define a winning
coalition as a coalition of parties whose members hold a majority of seats in
the parliament.
Within this framework I define an equilibrium outcome as a pair formed
by a winning coalition and a policy compromise, such that there is no other
winning coalition that could form and offer a policy that would improve the
welfare of all its members, that is, I assume that an equilibrium outcome has
to satisfy the stand-alone principle.
Definition: An equilibrium outcome is a coalition of parties C∗, and a
policy (e∗, s∗) ∈ <2 such that:
i) C∗ is a winning coalition.
ii) There is no (C, (e, s)) such that C is a winning coalition and Vi (C, (e, s)) ≥
Vi (C∗, (e∗, s∗)) for all i ∈ C, with at least one strict inequality.
The assumptions of this model and the definition of equilibrium imply
that all the policies that are relevant for my analysis will lie in the Pareto set,
that is, the unit square [0, 1]2. Furthermore, all equilibrium policies will be
Pareto Optimal and Individually Rational within the equilibrium coalition.
Given a set of parameter values for each party (ki, vi, σi) for each i ∈
{PSC + IC, ERC, CIU , PPC} , in equilibrium, generically I have a unique
equilibrium coalition and a continuum of equilibrium policies.
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2.1 Acceptable Policy Sets
The utility that a party obtains from becoming a member of the governing
coalition, ki,may also be thought of as its reservation value: a party will never
accept to become a member of a governing coalition if it has to support a
policy from which it derives a (dis)utility larger than the value that the party
obtains from holding office.
Formally, the set of policies that party i is willing to accept as government
proposals when his alternative is to stay out of office, is given by A (i) =
{(e, s) : Ui (e, s) ≥ 0}. The size of these sets depend on the value of ki : the
larger the value of holding office the larger the set of policies that party i is
willing to support in a given governing coalition, that is, the more a party
values to be a member of the governing coalition the more flexible it will be
in terms of trading-off policy. See figure 2.
A winning coalition that pretends to form a government faces a bargaining
problem: the coalition members have to commit to a common policy position.
We will say that a policy is acceptable by a certain coalition if there is no
other policy that gives a larger utility to one of the parties and no smaller
to the others, and gives at least the reservation value to all parties. This
implies that an acceptable policy gives all parties in the coalition a utility
level of at least their reservation value and it is Pareto Optimal within the
coalition’s bargaining set. I represent the set of policies that are acceptable
by a coalition of two parties i and j by A (i, j). See figure 3.
Generally, let A (C) denote the set of policies that coalition C is willing
to accept as government proposals when the alternative of each member is
to stay out of office. Thus, A (C) = ∩i∈CA (i) . The size of these sets depend
on the value of ki for the members of the coalition: and also on the values of
their relative preference intensity.
We need some notation that refers to the boundaries of these sets. Let¡
e∗ij, s∗ij
¢
denote the maximal element in the set A (j) according to party i’s
policy preferences, Ui (e, s) , that is¡
e∗ij, s∗ij
¢
= argmax
e,s
Ui (e, s) s.t. (e, s) ∈ A (j)
From the assumptions of my model it is easy to show that this maxi-
mal element is unique. Given
¡
e∗ij, s∗ij
¢
let’s define u∗ij = Ui
¡
e∗ij, s∗ij
¢
that
represents the maximal utility level that party j can offer to party i.
Finally, given
¡
e∗ij, s∗ij
¢
let eij and esij be defined such that Ui (eij, si) =
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Ui
¡
e∗ij, s∗ij
¢
and Ui (ei, esij) = Ui ¡e∗ij, s∗ij¢ respectively.
In particular, we will have that if parties i and j agree on issue e, then
e∗ij = ei and esij = s∗ij. Similarly, if parties i and j agree on issue s, then
s∗ij = si and eij = e∗ij.
2.2 Winning Coalitions
The assumptions of my model and the definition of equilibrium imply that,
generically, equilibrium coalitions must be minimal winning coalitions. A
minimal winning coalition is defined as a winning coalition that would not
be supported by a majority of seats in the parliament (would not be a winning
coalition) if one of its party members was removed from it. The stand-alone
principle implies that generically1 we will have that only minimal winning
coalitions can be part of an equilibrium outcome, as predicted by von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern (1953).
Given the proportion of seats of each party in the parliament, vPSC+IC ,
vERC , vCIU , and vPPC , we have only two possible different scenarios in equi-
librium:
1) In the "dominant party scenario", there is a party that is a member
of all winning coalitions of two parties. We are in this scenario whenever the
coalition formed by the largest and the smallest party is a winning coalition.
2) In the "dominated party scenario", there is a party that is not a mem-
ber of any minimal winning coalition. We are in this scenario whenever
the coalition formed by the largest and the smallest party is not a winning
coalition.
Furthermore, whenever there is a minimal winning coalition of three par-
ties we are in the dominant party scenario; otherwise, when there is no
minimal winning coalition of three parties, we are in the dominated party
scenario. This result is stated and proven in Aragones (2007).
In order to illustrate this result consider my four parties and the share of
parliament seats that each one controls and suppose that: vCIU ≥ vPSC+IC ≥
vERC ≥ vPPC .
1Non generically, we can have that a non minimal winning coalition is part of an equi-
librium outcome, but in that case there would also be a minimal winning coalition that
is part of an equlibrium such that its set of equilibrium policies coincides with the corre-
sponding to first one. Therefore, without loss of generality, we will restrict our equilibrium
analysis to minimal winning coalitions.
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If vCIU + vPPC > 12 then we are in the dominant party scenario, where
the party with the largest number of seats, CIU, is the dominant party.
Otherwise, we must have that vCIU + vPPC < 12 . In this case we are in
the dominated party scenario, where the party with the smallest number of
seats, PPC, is the dominated party.
Notice that I do not consider the cases in which one party or one coalition
holds exactly one half or exactly one quarter of the seats of the parliament.
The reason is that in the catalan parliament there are 135 seats, and there-
fore, those cases can never be observed.
Observe that the dominant party is always the party with the largest
number of seats but the party with the largest number of seats is not neces-
sarily the dominant party. Similarly, the dominated party is always the party
with the smallest number of seats but the party with the smallest number of
seats is not necessarily the dominated party.
3 Equilibrium Governing Coalitions
I have shown before that given the distribution of parliament seats among
the four parties, there are only two possible scenarios: a dominant party
scenario and a dominated party scenario. If we look at the electoral results
in the different legislatures of the catalan parliament we find that over time
the distribution of seats satisfies the following condition:
vCIU , vPSC+IC >> vERC , vPPC
This condition is reinforced by the electoral results obtained by these
parties in the other elections, such as municipal elections, state elections,
european parliament elections, etc... It implies that the possibilities for the
catalan parliament are restricted to those cases in which the dominant party
is either PSC+IC or CIU, and those cases in which the dominated party is
either ERC or PPC.
In this section, I analyze for each scenario the different governing coali-
tions that will form in equilibrium and the policy implemented in each case.
I assume that for all relevant coalitions the sets of acceptable policies are not
empty, whenever it is not stated otherwise.
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3.1 Dominant Party Scenario
Suppose that we are in the dominant party scenario and CIU is the dominant
party. In this case we have that: vCIU + vERC > 12 , vCIU + vPSC+IC >
1
2
, vCIU + vPPC > 12 , and vPSC+IC + vERC + vPPC >
1
2
. The minimal winning
coalitions are given by: CIU with ERC,CIU with PSC + IC, CIU with
PPC, and PSC + IC with ERC and PPC.
The relevant strategies in this scenario are the following: party CIU may
decide to offer a proposal to form a coalition to any of the other three parties,
and each one of the other parties may decide either to accept the proposal
from party CIU or to join the three party coalition: PSC + IC with ERC
and PPC. Thus, there are four possible outcomes in this scenario. I divide
the analysis into four different cases that cover all the possibilities. These
cases depend on whether the set of acceptable policies for coalition CIU with
PSC+ IC is empty or not and whether the set of acceptable policies for the
three party coalition (PSC + IC with ERC and PPC) is empty or not.
Case 1: A(CIU,PSC + IC) = ∅ and A(PSC + IC,ERC,PPC) = ∅
First, suppose that the set of acceptable policies for coalition CIU with
PSC + IC is empty, and the set of acceptable policies for the three party
coalition is also empty. In this case, the only possibilities for equilibrium are
CIU withERC and CIU with PPC. Thus, CIU has to choose his governing
partner between ERC and PPC. Since neither ERC or PPC can have an
alternative feasible offer to form a governing coalition, they can only compete
between themselves to become CIU ’s partner in the governing coalition.
Since ERC’s maximal compromise policy is (e∗CIU,ERC , 1) and PPC’s is
(1, s∗CIU,PPC), by comparing the utility that CIU derives from each offer we
can find out the equilibrium outcome. Since
UCIU(e∗CIU,ERC , 1) = kCIU − CIU
¡
1− e∗CIU,ERC
¢2
UCIU(1, s∗CIU,PPC) = kCIU − σCIU
¡
1− s∗CIU,PPC
¢2
and e∗CIU,ERC =
q
kERC
ERC , s
∗
CIU,PPC =
q
kPPC
σPPC and CIU = 1 − σCIU , we
have that in equilibrium CIU joins ERC in a coalition if and only if
σCIU
1− σCIU
≥
³
1−
q
kERC
ERC
´2
³
1−
q
kPPC
σPPC
´2
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Similarly, in equilibrium CIU joins PPC in a coalition if and only if
σCIU
1− σCIU
≤
³
1−
q
kERC
ERC
´2
³
1−
q
kPPC
σPPC
´2
Thus, CIU joins ERC in an equilibrium coalition when σCIU is large
enough, that is, when CIU cares enough about the sovereignty issue. CIU
will join PPC in an equilibrium coalition when σCIU is small enough, that
is, when CIU cares enough about being rightist. See figures 4 and 5.
Notice that UCIU(e∗CIU,ERC , 1) ≥ UCIU(1, s∗CIU,PPC) if and only if eCIU,PPC ≤
e∗CIU,ERC if and only if esCIU,ERC ≥ s∗CIU,PPC .
In case coalition CIU with ERC forms the equilibrium policies will be
those (e∗, s∗) such that e∗ ∈
¡eCIU,PPC , e∗CIU,ERC¢ and s∗ = 1. Similarly, when
coalition CIU with PPC forms the equilibrium policies will be those (e, s)
such that e∗ = 1 and s∗ ∈
¡esCIU,ERC , s∗CIU,PPC¢ .
Case 2: A(CIU,PSC + IC) 6= ∅ and A(PSC + IC,ERC,PPC) = ∅.
Suppose that the set of acceptable policies for coalition CIU with PSC+
IC is not empty and the set of policies for the three party coalition is empty.
In this case, the possibilities for equilibrium coalitions are CIU with ERC,
CIU with PSC + IC, and CIU with PPC. Therefore, CIU is clearly the
key party, and has to choose among all the other parties its partner in the
governing coalition.
The utility that CIU obtains from the best offer of each possible partner
is given by:
UCIU(e∗CIU,ERC , 1) = kCIU − CIU
¡
1− e∗CIU,ERC
¢2
UCIU(1, s∗CIU,PPC) = kCIU − σCIU
¡
1− s∗CIU,PPC
¢2
UCIU(e∗CIU,PSC+IC , s∗CIU,PSC+IC) = kCIU − CIU
¡
1− e∗CIU,PSC+IC
¢2
−σCIU
¡
1− s∗CIU,PSC+IC
¢2
The equilibrium outcome depends on the utility that CIU derives from
each policy offer:
i) if eCIU,PSC+IC ≤ eCIU,PPC ≤ e∗CIU,ERC and esCIU,PSC+IC ≤ s∗CIU,PPC ≤esCIU,ERC
thenC∗ = (CIU,ERC) and (e∗, s∗) is such that e∗ ∈
¡eCIU,PPC , e∗CIU,ERC¢
and s∗ = 1.
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ii) if eCIU,PSC+IC ≤ e∗CIU,ERC ≤ eCIU,PPC and esCIU,PSC+IC ≤ esCIU,ERC ≤
s∗CIU,PPC
then C∗ = (CIU, PPC) and (e∗, s∗) is such that e∗ = 1 and s∗ ∈¡esCIU,ERC , s∗CIU,PPC¢ .
Notice that the analysis of these two sub-cases is exactly like the one
performed in case one. Thus, the conditions obtained there also hold here:
coalition CIU with ERC forms for large values of σCIU and coalition CIU
with PPC forms for small values of σCIU .
iii) if eCIU,PPC ≤ eCIU,PSC+IC ≤ e∗CIU,ERC and s∗CIU,PPC ≤ esCIU,PSC+IC ≤esCIU,ERC
thenC∗ = (CIU,ERC) and (e∗, s∗) is such that e∗ ∈
¡eCIU,PSC+IC , e∗CIU,ERC¢
and s∗ = 1.
iv) if e∗CIU,ERC ≤ eCIU,PSC+IC ≤ eCIU,PPC and esCIU,ERC ≤ esCIU,PSC+IC ≤
s∗CIU,PPC
then C∗ = (CIU, PPC) and (e∗, s∗) is such that e∗ = 1 and s∗ ∈¡esCIU,PSC+IC , s∗CIU,PPC¢ .
The analysis of these two cases is similar to the previous ones, except
that here the party that poses a relevant threat to the equilibrium coalition
is PSC + IC, thus, the policies that can be implemented in equilibrium
are determined by PSC+IC’s offers. Once more, we obtain as a result that
coalition CIU with ERC forms for large values of σCIU and coalition CIU
with PPC forms for small values of σCIU .
v) if eCIU,PPC ≤ e∗CIU,ERC ≤ eCIU,PSC+IC and s∗CIU,PPC ≤ esCIU,ERC ≤esCIU,PSC+IC
then C∗ = (CIU,PSC + IC) and
(e∗, s∗) ∈ A (CIU,PSC + IC)∩
©
(e, s) : UCIU (e, s) ≥ UCIU
¡
e∗CIU,ERC , 1
¢ª
vi) if e∗CIU,ERC ≤ eCIU,PPC ≤ eCIU,PSC+IC and esCIU,ERC ≤ s∗CIU,PPC ≤esCIU,PSC+IC
then C∗ = (CIU,PSC + IC) and
(e∗, s∗) ∈ A (CIU,PSC + IC)∩
©
(e, s) : UCIU (e, s) ≥ UCIU
¡
1, s∗CIU,PPC
¢ª
In these last two cases the party chosen by CIU to form the governing
coalition is PSC+IC. These cases are not likely to be part of an equilibrium
because the offers from PSC + IC may defeat the best offers from CIU ’s
neighbors (ERC and PPC) only under very special conditions. In particular,
CIU ’s value of holding office must be relatively small and PSC+ IC’s value
of holding office must be relatively large. See figure 6.
Case 3: A(CIU,PSC + IC) = ∅ and A(PSC + IC,ERC,PPC) 6= ∅
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Now, suppose that the set of acceptable policies for coalition CIU with
PSC + IC is empty and the set of policies for the three party coalition is
not empty. In this case, the possibilities for equilibrium coalitions are CIU
with ERC and CIU with PPC as before, and in addition we have the three
party coalition formed by PSC + IC with ERC and PPC.
The different equilibrium outcomes in this case are as follows:
i) if e∗ERC,CIU ≤ eERC,PPC , s∗PPC,CIU ≤ esPPC;ERC andUCIU (eERC,PPC , 1) >
UCIU
¡
1, s∗CIU,PPC
¢
thenC∗ = (CIU,ERC) and (e∗, s∗) is such that e∗ ∈ (eCIU,PPC , eERC,PPC)
and s∗ = 1.
ii) if e∗ERC,CIU ≤ eERC,PPC , s∗PPC,CIU ≤ esPPC;ERC andUCIU (eERC,PPC , 1) ≤
UCIU
¡
1, s∗CIU,PPC
¢
then there is no equilibrium.
iii) if e∗ERC,CIU ≤ eERC,PPC , s∗PPC,CIU ≤ esPPC;ERC and UCIU ¡e∗CIU,ERC , 1¢ <
UCIU (1, esPPC,ERC)
then C∗ = (CIU, PPC) and (e∗, s∗) is such that e∗ = 1 and s∗ ∈
(esCIU,ERC , esPPC,ERC) .
iv) if e∗ERC,CIU ≤ eERC,PPC , s∗PPC,CIU ≤ esPPC;ERC andUCIU ¡e∗CIU,ERC , 1¢ ≥
UCIU (1, esPPC,ERC)
then there is no equilibrium.
v) if e∗ERC,CIU ≤ eERC,PPC and s∗PPC,CIU ≥ esPPC,ERC
thenC∗ = (CIU,ERC) and (e∗, s∗) is such that e∗ ∈
¡
e∗ERC,CIU , eERC,PPC¢
and s∗ = 1.
vi) if e∗ERC,CIU ≥ eERC,PPC and s∗PPC,CIU ≤ esPPC;ERC
then C∗ = (CIU, PPC) and (e∗, s∗) is such that e∗ = 1 and s∗ ∈¡
s∗PPC,CIU , esPPC,ERC¢.
The analysis of these cases is similar to the previous ones, and we still have
that coalition CIU with ERC forms for large values of σCIU and coalition
CIU with PPC forms for small values of σCIU .
Consider the following set of policies:eP = ©(e, s) : UERC (e, s) ≥ UERC ¡e∗ERC,CIU , 1¢ , UPPC (e, s) ≥ UPPC ¡1, s∗PPC,CIU¢ª
vii) if eP∩A (ERC,PPC, PSC + IC) 6= ∅ thenC∗ = (ERC,PPC,PSC + IC)
and (e∗, s∗) ∈ eP ∩A (ERC,PPC,PSC + IC).
viii) if e∗ERC,CIU ≥ eERC,PPC ,s∗PPC,CIU ≥ esPPC;ERC and eP∩A (ERC,PPC,PSC + IC) =
∅ then we have no equilibrium.
In Aragones (2007) it is shown that the conditions under which the three
party coalition may be part of an equilibrium outcome are very restrictive. It
14
is necessary that the reservation values for the three parties in the coalition
are large enough in order to guarantee a non empty set of acceptable policies
for the three party coalition, and in addition it is necessary that the reserva-
tion value of CIU is small enough in order to have it forming in equilibrium.
When this is not the case, CIU will play the role of the key party and will
choose its partner as before. See figure 7.
Case 4: A(CIU,PSC + IC) 6= ∅ and A(PSC + IC,ERC,PPC) 6= ∅
Suppose that the set of acceptable policies for coalition CIU with PSC+
IC is not empty and the set of policies for the three party coalition is not
empty. This case is analyzed in detail in Aragones (2007) and it is shown that
the coalition between PSC + IC and CIU cannot be part of an equilibrium
outcome, because the key party in this case, CIU , will always prefer one of
the offers from either ERC or PPC to any offer from PSC + IC. Thus, the
outcomes in this case coincide with the ones found in case 3.
Summary of results for the dominant party scenario:
I have found that coalition CIU with PPC forms in equilibrium when-
ever party CIU ’s relative preference intensity for nationalism (σCIU) is small
enough. Otherwise, I have shown that coalition CIU with ERC forms in
equilibrium whenever party CIU ’s relative preference intensity for national-
ism (σCIU) is large enough.
For values of σCIU close to 1/2 we may have different equilibrium out-
comes. If the set of acceptable policies by the three party coalition is empty
then coalition CIU with PSC + IC may form in equilibrium if kPSC+IC is
large enough. If the set of acceptable policies by the three party coalition
is not empty then existence of equilibrium is only guaranteed under cer-
tain conditions. When they hold we can also have the three party coalition,
PSC + IC with ERC and PPC forming in equilibrium. For intermediate
values of σCIU , coalition PSC + IC with ERC and PPC may form in equi-
librium only when σPPC is large enough and σERC is small enough, kERC
and kPPC are small enough and u∗CIU − kCIU is large enough. Otherwise we
would have cycles.
Notice that the parameter value that determines which equilibrium pre-
vails in this case is σCIU . Observe that the conditions for existence of equi-
libria with governing coalitions CIU with PPC and CIU with ERC are
much weaker that those needed for the equilibria with governing coalition
PSC + IC with ERC and PPC. Thus, the key party in the ’dominant
party scenario’ coincides with the dominant party itself, which in this case
was CIU .
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A parallel analysis would show that the equilibrium outcomes when party
PSC + IC is the dominant party can be obtained likewise.
3.2 Dominated Party Scenario
Suppose that we are in the dominated party scenario and party PPC is the
dominated party. In this case we have that: vPSC+IC + vERC > 12 , vPSC+IC +
vCIU > 12 and vERC + vCIU >
1
2
.Thus, the minimal winning coalitions are
given by: ERC with PSC+IC, ERC with CIU , and PSC+IC with CIU.
The relevant strategies in this scenario are the following: party PSC+IC
may accept to form a coalition with either party ERC or party CIU ; party
ERC may accept to form a coalition with either party PSC + IC or party
CIU ; finally, party CIU may accept to form a coalition with either party
PSC + IC or party ERC. Thus, there are three possible outcomes in this
scenario. I divide the analysis in two different cases that depend on whether
the set of acceptable policies for coalition CIU with PSC + IC is empty or
not.
Case 1: A(CIU,PSC + IC) = ∅
Suppose that the set of acceptable policies for coalition CIU with PSC+
IC is empty. In this case, the only possibilities for equilibrium coalitions are
ERC with CIU and ERC with PSC+ IC. In this case ERC has to choose
his governing partner between CIU and PSC + IC. Since neither CIU nor
PSC+IC can have an alternative feasible offer to form a governing coalition,
they can only compete between themselves to become ERC’s partner in the
governing coalition.
Since CIU ’s maximal compromise policy is (e∗ERC,CIU , 1) and PSC+IC’s
is (0, s∗ERC,PSC+IC), by comparing the utility that ERC derives from each
offer we can find out the equilibrium outcome. Since
UERC(e∗ERC,CIU , 1) = kERC − ERC
¡
e∗ERC,CIU
¢2
UERC(0, s∗ERC,PSC+IC) = kERC − σERC
¡
1− s∗ERC,PSC+IC
¢2
and e∗ERC,CIU =
q
kCIU
CIU , s
∗
ERC,PSC+IC =
q
kPSC+IC
σPSC+IC and ERC = 1−σERC ,
we have that in equilibrium ERC joins CIU in a coalition if and only if
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σERC
1− σERC
≥
³
1−
q
kCIU
CIU
´2
³
1−
q
kPSC+IC
σPSC+IC
´2
Similarly, in equilibrium ERC joins PSC + IC in a coalition if and only
if
σERC
1− σERC
≤
³
1−
q
kCIU
CIU
´2
³
1−
q
kPSC+IC
σPSC+IC
´2
Thus, ERC joins CIU in an equilibrium coalition when σERC is large
enough, that is, when ERC cares enough about the sovereignty issue. ERC
will join PSC + IC in an equilibrium coalition when σERC is small enough,
that is, when ERC cares enough about being leftist. See figures 8 and 9.
Notice that UERC(e∗ERC,CIU , 1) ≥ UERC(0, s∗ERC,PSC+IC) if and only if
e∗ERC,CIU ≤ eERC,PSC+IC if and only if esERC,CIU ≥ s∗ERC,PSC+IC .
In case coalition ERC with CIU forms the equilibrium policies will be
those (e∗, s∗) such that e∗ ∈
¡
e∗ERC,CIU , eERC,PSC+IC¢ and s∗ = 1. Similarly,
when coalition ERC with PSC + IC forms the equilibrium policies will be
those (e, s) such that e∗ = 1 and s∗ ∈
¡esERC,CIU , s∗ERC,PSC+IC¢ .
Case 2: A(CIU,PSC + IC) 6= ∅.
Suppose that the set of acceptable policies for coalition CIU with PSC+
IC is not empty. In this case, the possibilities for equilibrium coalitions are
ERC with CIU , ERC with PSC + IC, and CIU with PSC + IC.
The equilibrium outcomes in this case are as follows:
i) if e∗CIU,ERC ≥ eCIU,PSC+IC and UERC (eCIU,PSC+IC , 1) > UERC ¡0, s∗ERC,PSC+IC¢
thenC∗ = (ERC,CIU) and (e∗, s∗) is such that e∗ ∈ (eCIU,PSC+IC , eERC,PSC+IC)
and s∗ = 1. Notice that in this case it is necessary that σERC is large enough.
ii) if e∗CIU,ERC ≥ eCIU,PSC+IC and UERC (eCIU,PSC+IC , 1) ≤ UERC ¡0, s∗ERC,PSC+IC¢
then there is no equilibrium.
iii) if s∗PSC+IC,ERC ≤ esPSC+IC,CIU andUERC ¡e∗ERC,CIU , 1¢ < UERC (0, esPSC+IC,CIU)
then C∗ = (ERC,PSC + IC) and (e∗, s∗) is such that e∗ = 1 and s∗ ∈
(esPSC+IC,CIU , esERC,CIU) . Notice that in this case it is necessary that σERC is
small enough.
iv) if s∗PSC+IC,ERC ≤ esPSC+IC,CIU and UERC ¡e∗ERC,CIU , 1¢ ≥ UERC (0, esPSC+IC,CIU)
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then there is no equilibrium.
Consider the following set of policies:bP = ©(e, s) : UCIU (e, s) ≥ UCIU ¡e∗CIU,ERC , 1¢ , UPSC+IC (e, s) ≥ UPSC+IC ¡0, s∗PSC+IC,ERC¢ª
v) if bP 6= ∅ then C∗ = (CIU, PSC + IC) and (e∗, s∗) ∈ bP . Notice that
in this case it is necessary that kERC is small enough.
vi) if e∗CIU,ERC ≤ eCIU,PSC+IC ,s∗PSC+IC,ERC ≥ esPSC+IC,CIU and bP = ∅
then we have no equilibrium.
The analysis of these cases is similar the one performed for the dominant
party scenario. The conditions obtained here are parallel to those found
there: coalition ERC with CIU forms for large values of σERC and coalition
ERC with PSC+IC forms for small values of σERC . Only under very special
conditions coalition CIU with PSC + IC forms. In particular, ERC’s value
of holding must be relatively small and CIU and PSC+IC’s value of holding
office must be relatively large. See figures 10 and 11.
Summary of results for the dominated party scenario:
I have found that coalition ERC with CIU forms in equilibrium when-
ever party ERC’s relative preference intensity for nationalism (σERC) is large
enough. Otherwise, I have shown that coalition ERC with PSC+ IC forms
in equilibrium whenever party ERC’s relative preference intensity for na-
tionalism (σERC) is small enough.
For values of σERC close to 1/2, existence of equilibrium is only guaranteed
under certain conditions. When they hold we can have coalition CIU with
PSC+IC forming in equilibrium. For intermediate values of σERC , coalition
PSC + IC with CIU may form in equilibrium but only when kERC is small
enough and kCIU and kPSC+IC are large enough. Otherwise we would have
cycles.
I have shown that the parameter value that determines which equilibrium
prevails in this case is σERC . Observe that the conditions for existence of
equilibria with governing coalitions ERC with CIU and ERC with PSC +
IC are much weaker that those needed for the equilibria with governing
coalition PSC+ IC with CIU . Thus, the key party in the ’dominated party
scenario’ coincides with the party that opposes completely the dominated
party in the ideological space, which in this case is ERC, because even if
party ERC is not a dominant party it is decisive in almost all cases to
determine the composition of the governing coalition.
A parallel analysis would show that the equilibrium outcomes when party
ERC is the dominated party can be obtained likewise.
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4 Discussion of the results
From the results obtained in the formal model we can explain some determi-
nants of the magnitude of the key party’s advantage:
Extreme relative preference intensity: The more extreme the relative pref-
erence intensity for one of the two issues, the less likely the existence of the
equilibrium in which the key player is left out.
Size of the key party’s set of acceptable policies: The larger is the key
party’s value of holding office, that is, the larger is its set of acceptable
policies, the more likely the equilibrium coalition will be the one chosen by
the key party.
Size of a coalition’s set of acceptable policies: The smaller the set of poli-
cies that are acceptable by the coalitions that do not have the key party as a
member, the larger the advantage of the key party. As an example of this im-
plication, consider the explicit claim made during the last two legislatures by
ERC and PPC that they would not ever be members of the same coalition.
This claim can be represented in my model by assuming that the set of ac-
ceptable policies by the this coalition is empty, that is, A (ERC,PPC) 6= ∅.
This claim is irrelevant in the dominated party scenario, since in this case
the coalitions that involve the dominated party do not play any role (be-
cause they are not winning coalitions). However, it has some relevance in
the dominant party scenario, since it implies that the three party coalition
has an empty set of acceptable policies and this softens the threats that
parties can offer to the dominant party, therefore it improves the dominant
party’s bargain position.
Next I discuss a couple of possible extensions of the formal model:
Vote share and endogenous value of holding office: I have assumed that
parties care mostly about holding office, and only instrumentally about pol-
icy, and I have represented a party’s value of holding office as an exogenous
positive constant. Relaxing this assumption, one could think that a party’s
expected vote in future elections depends positively on the vote support ob-
tained by the party in the current election. Thus I could represent the present
value of holding office by an increasing function of the party’s current vote
share. Suppose that ki = k (vi) with k0i (vi) ≥ 0. In this case we will find
that the larger the vote share of a party, the larger the utility that it derives
from holding office, and the more it would be willing to compromise its policy
position in order to become a member of the winning coalition. Thus, the
sets of policies that are individually rational will be larger for parties with
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larger vote share. In both the dominant and the dominated party scenarios
the size of the vote share of the key player affects the likelihood of existence
of the equilibrium in which the key player is left out in a very intuitive way:
the larger the vote share of the key party, the less likely it is that the winning
coalition that leaves it out can be part of an equilibrium.
Revelation of the parties’ preferences: The equilibrium outcomes obtained
depend on the parties’ values of holding office (ki) and on their relative
intensity of preferences between the two issues (σi). These values are private
information, and it is not obvious that parties will have incentives to reveal
their true value. Since the equilibrium outcomes corresponding to a set of
parameter values are given by a unique governing coalition and a continuum
of policies, it is possible to think of an equilibrium refinement based on the
parties’ incentives to reveal their private information.
5 Implications
The results of my model show that in each possible scenario there is one party
that has a clear advantage. I call it the key party. Empirical results from the
catalan elections imply that CIU and PSC + IC are the only parties that
could play the role of the dominant party, and ERC and PPC are the only
ones that could play the role of the dominated party.
When I consider the governments formed in Catalonia between 1980 and
2006, we have that out of the eight different legislatures, six of them are
characterized by the dominant party scenario, and only two of them can be
represented by the dominated party scenario. We find that PSC+IC was the
dominant party in 1980, CIU has been the dominant party between 1984 and
1999, and PPC has been the dominated party in 2003 and 2006. Furthermore,
out of the five legislatures in which CIU has been the dominant party, in three
instances CIU has held an absolute majority. See table 3.
In 1980 the governing coalition that formed included CIU, ERC, and
UCD, despite PSC+IC was the dominant party. I will not go further into the
analysis of the 1980 election because in that election the number of parties
that obtained representation in the parliament was much larger than four
and the results of our analysis would be much weaker, since I would have to
assume that several parties that share the same ideological views over the two
dimensions are treated as a unique strategic agent with a common objective.
I think that this assumption is too strong and therefore, its results should
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not be considered as significant.
The first three instances in which CIU was a dominant party, CIU had
an absolute majority of seats in the parliament, thus, obviously in those
cases the government was formed by party CIU alone; there was no need
to bargain over policy, and the policy implemented should be interpreted
as CIU’s ideal point. In the other cases in which CIU was the dominant
party (the legislatures starting at 1995 and 1999) a CIU minority government
formed with the support of PPC, thus the ’de facto’ governing coalition was
formed by CIU with PPC. Finally, the governing coalition formed in 2003
and 2006, when PPC was the dominated party, was the three-party coalition
that included PSC, IC and ERC.
If we consider possible government coalitions for the future, given the
trend of the vote in the past years, we should expect that, as in the past,
there will be two parties that will obtain a large share of the seats, and the
other two parties will obtain a much smaller share. Thus, it is plausible to
expect that also in the future CIU and PSC + IC will be the only parties
that could play the role of the dominant party, and ERC and PPC will be
the only ones that could play the role of the dominated party.
6 Strategic Implications
Given the clear advantage of the key party, it may be in the interest of each
party to find out how to increase its chances of becoming the key party.
Since the vote share of each party can be though of being determined as an
outcome of the electoral campaign, a party’s objective during the campaign
may imply to obtain a certain composition of the parliament such that the
party maximizes his chances of becoming the key party in the formation of
the governing coalition. Since CIU and PSC + IC are the only parties that
could play the role of the dominant party, they will be interested in obtaining
an election result that forces a dominant party scenario in which themselves
are the key party. Similarly, since ERC and PPC are the only ones that
could play the role of the dominated party, they would prefer an election
result that leads to a dominated party scenario in which themselves are the
key party.
The results obtained from our analysis imply that compared to the current
composition of the parliament and besides increasing their own share of seats,
the catalan parties’s preferences with respect to the parliament composition
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for the coming elections are as follows:
CIU would like PPC to increase its share of the seats and PSC+IC
to decrease its share: CIU would like to maintain a larger proportion of seats
than PSC+IC so that increasing PPC’s proportion will take catalan politics
back to a dominant party scenario with CIU being the key party.
PSC + IC would like CIU to decrease its share of the seats, and
PPC to increase its share, so that PSC + IC could become the key party
in a dominant party scenario.
ERC would like PPC not to increase its share, so that the current
dominated party scenario continues with ERC being the key party.
PPC would like ERC to decrease its share of seats so that cata-
lan politics moves to a new dominated party scenario with ERC being the
dominated party and PPC being the key party.
Considering that the nationalist vote has been held constant over the
last elections, if we expect this trend to continue in the future we should
expect that the number of parliament seat corresponding to centralist parties
equals that corresponding to nationalist parties, that is, vCIU + vERC ≈
vPSC+IC + vPPC . This implies that CIU 0s best option is feasible (increase
CIU and PPC’s share and decrease PSC+ IC’s share) but PSC+ IC best
option would not be feasible since it involves increasing both the vote for
PSC + IC and the vote for PPC.
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FIGURE 11: PPC dominated,  
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Table 1: Distribution of seats among parties in the Catalan Parliament. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Distribution of seats among ideological groups in the Catalan Parliament. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Percentage of seats corresponding to each ideological group.  
 
 
 80 84 88 92 95 99 03 06 
CIU 43 72 69 70 60 56 46 48 
ERC 14 5 6 11 13 12 23 21 
AP - 11 6 - - - - - 
PPC - - - 7 17 12 15 14 
UCD 18 - - - - - - - 
CDS - - 3 - - - - - 
C - - - - - - - 3 
PSC 33 41 42 40 34 52 42 37 
PSUC 25 6 - - - - - - 
PSA 2 - - - - - - - 
IC-EV - - 9 7 11 3 9 12 
 
 80 84 88 92 95 99 03 06 
CIU 43 72 69 70 60 56 46 48 
ERC 14 5 6 11 13 12 23 21 
PPC 18 11 9 7 17 12 15 17 
PSC+IC 60 47 51 47 45 55 51 49 
 
 80 84 88 92 95 99 03 06 
CIU 31.8* 53.3* 51.1* 51.8* 44.4* 41.5* 34.1 35.5
ERC 10.4 3.7 4.4 8.1 9.6 8.9 17.0* 15.5*
PPC 13.3 8.1 6.7 5.1 12.6 8.9 11.1 12.6
PSC+IC 44.4 34.8 37.8 34.8 33.3 40.7 37.8 36.3
